What are you investigating? Why?
The researcher is investigating on the perceptions of the three leaders in maneuvering and speeding up the legislation of the controversial USA PATRIOT Act that after the infamous Sept. 9, 2001 event, this act was enacted in less than one month and thirteen days in the Senate and approved (Oct. 26, 2001)[1] by Pres. Bush immediately.
The purpose of this study is to assess the schema of the three US leaders using Operational Code analysis through the Verbs In Context System method of content analysis in influencing in the creation of the said law. This will also serve if the perceptions of the three US leaders are consonance with a certain pattern of political belief[2], that somehow affect the thinking of other leaders as manifested in creating anti-terrorism laws worldwide.
Problem:
Are perceptions of political leaders specifically by Pres. Bush, former Sec. of State Powell and former Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld enough to influence in the process of legislating the USA PATRIOT Act during the heights of 9/11 attack?
The study will concentrate on how these three political leaders focuses on a set of beliefs in response to the 9/11 event, which paves the way for the creation of an anti-terrorism law—the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001).[3]
Hypothesis:
If the perceptions of these three leaders (Pres. Bush, former Sec. of State Powell, & former Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld) have influenced in the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act after the 9/11 catastrophe.
Putative relationship of the independent and dependent variables:
IV
Perceptions of Pres. Bush, Sec. of State Powell, & Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld
DV
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
What have others done within the subject area?
A number of literatures that were surveyed which resulted to take operational code in analyzing and conceptualizing the schemata of political leaders. It suggests reliability in using content analysis as the technique for assessing these leaders and in the prediction of their leadership.[4] (Survey of Literature)
--> Samuel Berwyn Robison had done an empirical research on U.S. foreign policy that has largely assumed of president’s influence is subordinate to global and domestic political constraints. This idea is given further weight by the fact that, even within the political psychology literature, there is scant large-n, quantitative evidence supporting the notion that leaders matter. This study is an attempt to explore the influence of U.S. presidential psychological characteristics on foreign policy actions through assessment of two operational code constructs: “image of the political universe” (P-1), and “strategic preferences” (I-1). This is assessed through an extensive sample of operational code beliefs for every president from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush. The dependent variable of policy actions is measured with event data. Findings show that previous actions by the U.S. toward the Middle East, previous actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S., and the president’s perceived image of the political universe are significantly related to foreign policy outcomes. This supports the policy continuity argument that pre-existing policies influence U.S. policies in the present, the policy reciprocation/escalation argument that the U.S. is influenced by what other states do, and the psychological argument that elites influence outcomes based on their personal belief systems.
--> In Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer on “The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: Belief Systems or Schemata?” they explore whether leaders matter in re-enforcing, qualifying, or undermining the assumption of the cultural explanation for the democratic peace. Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference as causal mechanisms in determining if democracies are more pacifistic than non-democracies and in explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? The examination of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveals evidence that undermines the monadic version and qualifies the dyadic version of the democratic peace argument. Monadically, Blair’s general operational code does not exhibit unabashedly pacifistic orientations toward any states, and Clinton’s general operational code is unconditionally pacifistic in dealing only with some states. Dyadically, it is likely that both leaders will take the initiative in moving toward a settlement in a deadlocked dispute with other democracies. The analysis suggests that operational codes as causal mechanisms are better conceptualized as schemata than as belief systems.
--> In another expound domain of study as investigated by Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton.” It reveals that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than non-democracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. They also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with non-democracies; the leaders’ exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with non-democracies.
--> In “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code” by Walker, Schafer and Young, they introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter’s operational code. Using speeches from public record, they construct indices for the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches. President Jimmy Carter’s views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. They found out that there’s statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and his approach to political action regarding the conduct of US-Soviet relations and other issues.
--> “The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?” by Akan and Johnna Malici, assumed that important mechanisms of continuity and change in communist states are situated in the belief systems of their leaders and that the years between 1985 and 1991 were a catalytic period. What did Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kim Il Sung of North Korea learn from the end of the Cold War? Their belief systems are examined prior to 1985 and after 1991, i.e., before and after the collapse of other communist regimes. If learning has occurred, it should be reflected in a comparison of their beliefs for these time periods. The results from ANOVA analyses indicate that Fidel Castro engaged in some learning but Kim Il Sung did not. This finding is complemented by the results of a MANOVA analysis, which indicate that the end of the Cold War had only a modest impact on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, independent of their specific personalities. They conclude by drawing attention to the ensuing debate between structural- and agent-level theorizing and by giving some suggestions for future research.
--> A study presented by Devlen, “Coercive Diplomacy and Operational Code Analysis: The Case of Slobodan Milosevic.” In this preliminary research which is a very sketchy analysis of the study. He investigated Milosevic’s operational code to determine to what extent the subjective schema overlap with other leader’s schema. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of sub-episodes within the broad phases may provide a valuable insight about specific moves or tactics adopted by Milosevic. Such an analysis requires additional data which are not available at this stage. Overall, the author believed that operational code analysis provides a useful tool in getting into the minds of the leaders and see the world as they see it.
--> Serif Mardin’s “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” he profoundly investigated the modernization of Turkey which usually covered a process primarily generated after the foundation of the Turkish republic. This is a clearly simplistic image that neglects to bring in the continuities between the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms and the Republic itself. These continuities may even be traced to the earlier rise of a Turkish bureaucratic class (1780). Another aspect of this simplification is that it neglects the type of institution building policy that goes back to the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) and the type of synthesis between Islam and modernity that was promoted by intellectual elite between 1908 and 1923. He used the operational code analysis in determining the schemata of Turkish leaders as to how Islam and modernity compromise each other.
What structure of explanation are you going to imply?
Framework:
To understand their beliefs, the researcher will use Anderson’s Schema Theory, wherein schema is a stored framework of cognitive knowledge that represents information about a topic, concept or a particular stimulus including its attributes and the relations among the attributes.[5] Schema Theory describes how we create psychological representations to perceive and understand reality, whether it’ll be reality in the outer world of people and things, or reality in the inner world of the psyche.[6]
According to Anderson, the characteristics of schemata are always organized meaningfully, can be added to, and, as an individual gains experience. Develop to include more variables and more specificity. Each schema is embedded in other schemata and itself contains subschema. Schemata change moment by moment as information is received.[7] They may also be reorganized when incoming data reveals, a need to restructure the concept. And the mental representations used during perception and comprehension, which evolve as a result of these processes, combine to form a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. (Liles & Wiegand 2002)
Schema theory lays out a picture of how people organize the truly astounding amount of background knowledge which they accumulate about the world. This theory asserts that such knowledge is organized into mental units called "schemata." When people learn, when they build knowledge, they are either creating new schemata, or linking together preexisting schemata in new ways.[8]
In order to describe and examine the Schema Theory on how an individual acts and responds when faced with specific types of situations in a perceptual phenomenon, the researcher will use Leites’ Operational Code which was later developed by George and Holsti. In a study funded by the U.S. government to assess the beliefs of the Soviet Politburo, Leites found through qualitative, interpretive analysis that these individuals possessed values, beliefs, and schema for understanding the world that was very different from the average American policy maker. (Cutler 1982; Robison 2005)
George modified this approach and argued that a leader’s operational code should be identified simply as a political belief system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs) guide the leader’s diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics in achieving goals. (Cutler 1982; Walker & Schafer 2006)
This is how he formulated the Operational Code of a political leader:
George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs[9]
The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
P-5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
Holsti subsequently developed a typology of political belief systems in response to George’s 10 questions, which he suggested were ideal types of operational codes. (Walker & Schafer 2006) However, the researcher will not delve on Holsti’s Operational Code typology because it’s much complex and difficult to understand. In another respect, the cognitive scripts for political action in the leader’s operational code beliefs may also be character prescriptions that express the identity of the leader as an actor in the political universe. (Walker 2000)
Operational code beliefs are further broken down from their philosophical and instrumental subgroups into 10 indices that evaluate specific beliefs regarding preferences for conflict or cooperation, the kinds of tactics preferred for achieving these ends, risk orientation, perceived hostility or friendliness (image perception) of the international system, likely realization of political values, predictability of the political future, perceptions of control over others, and the role of chance regarding political outcomes. (Robison 2005) Below is an improved approach on George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs with specific indices and interpretations (Walker, Schafer, & Young 1998):
Indices for Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
Elements Index Interpretation
P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL %Positive minus %Negative +1.0 friendly to
UNIVERSE (Image of Others) Transitive Other Attributions -1.0 hostile
P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 optimistic to
VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism) Other Attributions divided by 3 -1.0 pessimistic
P-3 POLITICAL FUTURE 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 predictable
(Predictability of Others’ Tactics) Variation for Other to 0.0 uncertain
Attributions
P-4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Self Attributions divided by 1.0 high to 0.0
(Locus of Control) [Self plus Other Attributions] low self control
P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence 1 minus [Political Future x 1.0 high role
of Control) Historical Development Index] to 0.0 low role
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
Elements Index Interpretation
I-1. APPROACH TO GOALS %Positive minus %Negative +1.0 high cooperation
(Direction of Strategy) Transitive Self Attributions to -1.0 high conflict
I-2. PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 high cooperation
of Tactics) Self Attributions divided by 3 to -1.0 high conflict
I-3. RISK ORIENTATION 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 risk acceptant
(Predictability of Tactics) Variation for Self Attributions to 0.0 risk-averse
I-4. TIMING OF ACTION 1 minus Absolute Value [%X 1.0 high to 0.0
(Flexibility of Tactics) minus %Y Self Attributions] low shift propensity
a. Coop v. Conf Tactics Where X = Coop and Y = Conf
b. Word v. Deed Tactics Where X = Word and Y = Deed
I-5. UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise Percentages for Exercise of +1.0 very frequent
of Power) Power Categories a through f to 0.0 infrequent
a. Reward a’s frequency divided by total
b. Promise b’s frequency divided by total
c. Appeal/Support c’s frequency divided by total
d. Oppose/Resist d’s frequency divided by total
e. Threaten e’s frequency divided by total
f. Punish f’s frequency divided by total
Method:
Since Leites’s initial foray, operational code analyses have evolved significantly, becoming a replicable, “scientifically” acceptable system of analysis that is now examined through a computerized content analysis program. (George 1969) The operational code looks at both philosophical and instrumental beliefs based on the rhetoric of political leaders, assessed through verb usage and strength.
The operational code will be evaluated through the Verbs in Context System (VICS) method of content analysis. This system focuses on verbs, as they are the direct linguistic representation of the posited hypothesis of this study. (Devlen 2006) Operational codes will be assessing through this method for every uttered public speeches by Pres. Bush, Sec. Powell and Rumsfeld.
Further, only prepared speeches will be assessed, including personal remarks prior to press conferences and photo sessions, State of the Union addresses, isolated statements, radio addresses, and speeches to foreign governing bodies, interest groups, and the United Nations, among others.
How speeches of Bush, Rice and Rumsfeld will be chosen from among the many they have delivered?
The researcher will only be concentrating on the public speeches/statements made by Pres. Bush, former Sec. of State Powell, and former Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld within a specific duration of time, that is after 9/11 to the approval of the USA PATRIOT Act (to be exact, from Sept. 12 to Oct. 26, 2001).
The following are some of the scanned websites with regard to released public statements:
-www.intelligence.gov
-www.heritage.org
-www.whitehouse.gov
-www.msnbc.msn.com
-www.911commission.gov
-www.state.gov
-www.pbs.org
-www.americanrhetoric.com
-911research.wtc7.net
-www.whatreallyhappened.com
-onlinejournal.com
-www.cooperativeresearch.org
-archive.democrats.com
-www.georgewbush.org
-www.historyplace.com
-www.publicintegrity.org
Microfilm news that has public speeches published from September 12 to October 26, 2001 will be considered. The researcher will also seek the help of US Embassy’s Thomas Jefferson library.
Significant additions from their official websites plus speeches released by the Intelligence Community, particularly remarks and statements by former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice congruent to the 9/11 event. The US Intelligence Community somehow has a direct influence on the schemata of the three leaders. Since their primal aim is to execute Executive Order 12333:[10]
"The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal."
Below are some of the National and State units and agencies that constitutes the US Intelligence Community (IC):[11]
-Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
-National Intelligence Council (NIC)
-President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
-National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
-National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)
-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
-National Security Agency (NSA)
-National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
-National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
-Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
-State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
-Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council
-Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis
-Intelligence Units of Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard
-Energy Department Office of Intelligence
-Department of the Treasury Office of Intelligence Support
Having cited the IC, which the researcher finds their links or websites that releases public statements of the three leaders concomitant with specific detailed topics about terrorism is imperative to the study.
Back on the method, The Verbs in Context System (VICS) method of content analysis draws inferences about a leader’s operational code from public sources—speeches, interviews or other public statements by the individual. The most relevant source for the systematic prediction of the state’s behavior is probably the public speech. (Walker & Schafer 2000) The VICS method of content analysis is a set of techniques for retrieving belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and drawing inferences about public behavior that are compatible with these beliefs. (Wiemer-Hastings P., Peter, & Wiemer-Hastings K. 1998)
The VICS asserts that (Walker & Schafer 2006):
Leader’s beliefs = inferences of state’s behavior
Retrieval unit = public statement; Recording unit = utterance
This is how the VICS work by stating its procedures or steps (Walker 2000):
Verbs in Context System
1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS
SELF OR OTHER
2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS
PAST PRESENT FUTURE
AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS
POSITIVE (+) OR NEGATIVE (-)
——————————————————
APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)
WORDS OR OR
PROMISE BENEFITS (+2) THREATEN COSTS (-2)
——————————————————
DEEDS REWARDS (+3) PUNISHMENTS (-3)
3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS
DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN
4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT
AN EXAMPLE
A quote taken from President Carter’s January 4, 1980, address to the nation: “Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan . . .”
1. Subject. The subject is “Massive Soviet military forces” which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.
2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase “have invaded” is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.
3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker’s state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.
4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.
The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past Afghanistan soviet-Afghanistan conflict-1979–88.
“Self” or “other” designates whether the speaker or some other actor is the subject of the verb. The verb is categorized in its tense as either a positive (+) or negative (-) intransitive verb or a positive (+) or negative (-) transitive verb. If it is a transitive verb, it is categorized further as representing either a cooperative (+) or conflictual (-) behavior that takes the form of a word or a deed. (Walker 2000:7)
Positive transitive deeds are coded as Rewards (+3) while negative transitive deeds are coded as Punishments (-3). Positive transitive words are coded as either Promises (+2) or Appeal/Support (+1), while negative transitive words are coded as either Threats (-2) or Oppose/Resist (-1). (Walker 2000:7)
Verbs that do not fit into one of these categories or which do not have a political context (i.e., do not deal with a policy domain or are not directed toward a political target) are coded as Neutral (0) and discarded. The remainder describes the leader’s beliefs about the intended or imagined exercise of power by self and others regarding the political issues raised in the public statement. (Walker 2000:8)
The calculation and interpretation of these indices is fairly straightforward and summarized below. (Walker 2000:7-11)
P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Hostile/Friendly)
HOSTILE FRIENDLY
VERY DEFINITELY SOMEWHAT MIXED SOMEWHAT DEFINITELY VERY
-.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75
I-1. DIRECTION OF STRATEGY (Conflict/Cooperation)
CONFLICT COOPERATION
VERY DEFINITELY SOMEWHAT MIXED SOMEWHAT DEFINITELY VERY
-.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75
For example, if Pres. Bush P-1 score is -.31, then he is “Somewhat Pessimistic” about the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals such as how he perceived the 9/11 and needs a drastic action by going to war or create an anti-terrorism law. An I-1 score of +.27 would indicate that he believes in “Somewhat Cooperative” tactics.
P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Very Low/Very High)
CONTROL CONTROL
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
I-5. UTILITY OF MEANS (Very Low/Very High)
A. COOPERATIVE MEANS: APPEAL/SUPPORT, PROMISE, REWARD
UTILITY UTILITY
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .08 .16 .24 .32
B. CONFLICT MEANS: OPPOSE/RESIST, THREATEN, PUNISH
UTILITY UTILITY
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .08 .16 .24 .32
P-3. PREDICTABILITY OF POLITICAL FUTURE (Very Low/Very High)
PREDICTABILITY PREDICTABILITY
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
I-3. RISK ORIENTATION (Very Low/Very High)
RISK ADVERSE RISK ACCEPTANT
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
Interpretation of these scores is enhanced by the indices for two related indices of the importance of ‘timing’: flexibility in shifting between different kinds of tactics as a risk management technique. These indices are calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the balance index for cooperation/conflict and words/deeds from one. (Walker 2000:9)
I-4. FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICS (Very Low/Very High)
A. BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
FLEXIBILITY FLEXIBILITY
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
B. BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS
FLEXIBILITY FLEXIBILITY
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
It is calculated by multiplying the leader’s scores for the latter two beliefs and subtracting the product from one. The logic of the index is that the higher the predictability of the political future and the greater the leader’s belief in his/her ability to control historical development, the less the role of chance. It is interpreted the same way as the other indices that incorporate measures of dispersion into their formulae. The higher the score, the greater the role of chance. (Walker 2000:10)
P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Very Low/Very High)
CHANCE CHANCE
VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH
0.0 .25 .50 .75 1.0
Collectively, the VICS indices provide information about a leader’s diagnostic, choice, and shift propensities regarding the exercise of power in different political contexts. Operational code analysis defines politics as a strategic interaction game, in which the beliefs by each player about the nature of the political universe and the most effective strategies and tactics in this universe determine choices about the exercise of power by the players and the ensuing outcomes of strategic interaction episodes between them. (Walker 2000:27)
Which part of that body of knowledge your paper will be added to?
The researcher humbly hopes that through this research, we may able to add to the realm of literature on how a law was ultimately mired by political leaders in maneuvering and speeding up the process of legislating USA PATRIOT Act in response to 9/11 based on the schemata of Pres. Bush, Former Sec. Powell and Rumsfeld instituting their operational codes by VICS. The 9/11 and USA PATRIOT Act is like a triggering factor that caused a rampant “domino effect” of influencing other nation-states in creating also a parallel law or act, some of these laws are stated below:[12]
-Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001
-Belgium Anti-Terrorism Act 2003
-Australian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005
-UK Terrorism Act of 2006
-Philippines Human Security Act of 2007
-El Salvador Special Law against Terrorist Acts 2006
Endnotes:
[1] As stated in Charles Doyle’s sketch on the USA PATRIOT Act.
[3] Also observed in Charles Doyle’s sketch on the USA PATRIOT Act.
[4] Take a look on compiled articles and journals edited by Margaret G. Hermann in her book entitled: “A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders.”
[5] See Pankaj Aggarwa & Ann L. Mcgill on “Schema Congruity.”
[6] See William F. Brewer’s “Schema Theory.”
[7] See Sharon Alayne Widmayer on her journal entitled: “Schema Theory: An Introduction.”
[8] Elaborated in Aggarwa’s schema congruity.
[9] See Alexander L. George on “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.”
[10] Taken from the website of Intelligence Community. <http://www.intelligence.gov/>
[11] Same as above (footnote #10).
Work Cited
Books
Knutson, Jeanne N. (ed.) Handbook of Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.
Northouse, Clayton (ed.) Protecting What Matters: Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
Thesis
Robison, Samuel Berwyn. “The Influence of Presidential Operational Code Beliefs on U.S. Foreign Policy Actions in the Middle East.” MA thesis. Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, December 2005.
Journals
Cutler, Robert M. "Unifying the Cognitive-Map and Operational-Code Approaches: A Theoretical Framework and an Empirical Example." Jönsson, Christer (ed.) Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics. London: Frances Pinter (1982): 91-121.
George, Alexander L. “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making.” JSTOR Archive. International Studies Quarterly. 13.2 (June 1969): 190-222.
Malici, Akan & Malici, Johnna. “The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?” International Society of Political Psychology. 26.3 (2005)
Mardin, Serif. “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes.” Turkish Studies. 6.2 (June 2005): 145-165. Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey (Frank Cass & Company Ltd.)
Walker, Stephen G. “Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs In Context System of Operational Code Analysis.” Social Science Automation, Inc. (24 May 2000)
Walker, Stephen G. & Schafer, Mark. “Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton.” International Studies Quarterly. 50 (2006): 561-583. © 2006 International Studies Association.
Walker, Stephen G. & Schafer, Mark. “The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: Belief Systems or Schemata?” Prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2000)
Walker, Stephen G., Schafer, Mark & Young, Michael D. “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code.” International Studies Quarterly. 42 (1998): 175-190. URL source: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/
Monographs in Online Articles
Aggarwa, Pankaj & Mcgill, Ann L. “Is That Car Smiling at Me? Schema Congruity as a Basis for Evaluating Anthropomorphized Products.”
Brewer, William F. “Schema Theory.” URL source:
Devlen, Balkan. “Coercive Diplomacy and Operational Code Analysis: The Case of Slobodan Milosevic.” University of Missouri-Columbia, Political Science Department. Prepared for the Annual Meeting of ISA in San Diego (22-26 March 2006)
Doyle, Charles “The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch.” CRS Report for Congress (18 April 2002)
Liles, William C. & Wiegand, R. Paul “Introduction to Schema Theory.” Summer Lecture Series 2002. A survey lecture of pessimistic & exact schema theory
Widmayer, Sharon Alayne. “Schema Theory: An Introduction.” George Mason University
Wiemer-Hastings, Peter., Graesser, Arthur C., & Wiemer-Hastings, Katja. “Inferring the Meaning of Verbs from Context.” National Science Foundation’s Learning and Intelligent Systems Unit University of Memphis, Psychology Department
URL source: http://reed.cs.depaul.edu/peterwh/papers/Wiemer-Hastingscogsci98.pdf
Websites
Schema Theory
URL source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schema_%28psychology%29
Terrorism laws worldwide
URL source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-terrorism_legislation
